Wittgenstein on Love
Wittgenstein on love I: Diaries, 1936-37
Love is preferential
In his response to Kierkegaard’s notion of proper and improper love –
the selfless and selfish love accordingly – Wittgenstein said that he does not
know any love that is not preferential. In his diaries, Wittgenstein remarked: “One
could say: What you call love for the fellow human being is self-interest.
Well, then I don’t know any love without self-interest, for I cannot
intervene in the eternal salvation of another” (Wittgenstein 2003, p. 131-133).
I believe that, Christensen was right in saying that, Wittgenstein was referring
to Kierkegaard in the phrase “One could say” in the above-cited remark
(Christensen 2020, p. 882). That is, Wittgenstein in that specific remark is
responding to Kierkegaard’s distinction between proper and improper love – the selfless
and selfish love.
Improper love for Kierkegaard, is a form of self-love because it is
based on one’s own preference (ibid., p. 880). That is, you love somebody
because that person matches your personal preference or standard for a beloved.
This is very common to modern day romantic love. As common love story goes, someone
falls in love with the person that is ideal for their own eyes. But in reality,
that someone did not really fall in love with the person he believes he falls
in love to. He is rather in love with the idea that that person falls under his
own preference. In a sense, he has only fallen in love with his own preference.
He has only loved himself – self-love or selfish love.
While proper love, for Kierkegaard, is selfless because it is based on
the love of God (Christensen 2020, p. 881). Here, you love another person not because the
other person fits well with your preference for a beloved. So, this love is not
selfish, that is, you are not thinking of your own self-interest in loving the
other. But, you think of the way to bring the other to love God. This is what
proper love is, that is, to love God. Our love with other people will only be
proper love if in doing so it will make the other love God. And to make another
person love God is to love another person (Kierkegaard 1847/2009, p. 113).
As previously stated,
Wittgenstein does not agree with the distinction between proper and improper
love that we see in Kierkegaard. For him, there is no love that is not preferential
– all love is preferential. Wittgenstein supports this by pointing out that we
are individuals – that is, we all have our individuality or particularity (Christensen
2020, p. 883). In other words, we are unique, we are all different from one
another. And to love, in human terms, is to acknowledge the fact that we are
individuals and appreciate the other’s individuality. Now, to do this, our own
preference is vital. If one does not have preference, how can he love a
particular individual? Without a preference you are not made aware of the
particularities of the other. Hence, not being able to appreciate a particular
individual and will just entertain anyone that is available.
But the more important thing about our preferences is that Wittgenstein believe that our preferences are not static but subject to will and responsibility (ibid.). This even more supports the point that preferences are vital to love. Because, as human beings, we have the will to change things – for one is our preferences. Initial preferences may enable us to fall in love with someone, that feeling that someone fits perfectly with our ideal of a beloved. While, it is the will to develop new preferences that may enable us to fully love a person. It is by willfully making other new preferences that we may be able to cater the other particularities of our beloved as we know her better through time. Our preferences will enable our love to grow in time.
Love is worldly
Wittgenstein’s remark
about love being preferential also in a way responded to Kierkegaard’s
characterization of proper love as consisting of the love of God. Love can only
be preferential for Wittgenstein (2003) because “[one] cannot intervene in the
eternal salvation of another” (p. 133). That is, one cannot make or force the
other love God. Because, the love of God is personal to each individual. As
Christensen (2020) puts it, “[t]he other's salvation or love of God is not
itself a possible object of love because it is a relation, not between lover
and loved one, but between every single person and God” (p. 883). So, I agree
with Christensen’s claim that Wittgenstein is thus basically saying that proper
love in Kierkegaard’s sense is not possible. There is no love in reality that
is consisting of and persisting for the love of God (ibid.). In contrast to
this, what Wittgenstein (2003) believes is that one can only love in a “world1y
sense” (p. 133) and “show respect for all that seems to reveal in me a striving
for what’s highest” (ibid.).
Wittgenstein on love II: Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology
Love is not an emotion
There are two ways in which emotion and love differs for Wittgenstein. Because
of these differences love is not an emotion (Lin 2021, p. 279). First, love
differs from emotion in terms of genuine duration. Second, love differs from
emotion in terms of being put to the test.
For Wittgenstein, genuine duration is characterized by explicit
identification of the start and end of something. As Wittgenstein wrote, “Where
there is genuine duration one can tell someone: ‘Pay attention and give me a
signal when the thing you are experiencing (the picture, the rattling etc.)
alters’” (RPP II 50). Emotions have genuine duration (RPP II 148). For example,
when someone is joyful. One can explicitly say to oneself and others at what
specific time that he is joyful. At the same time, one can in the same manner
tell when his joy fades out.
Love, in contrast, has no genuine duration. It is impossible for someone
to tell when did he start loving a person. The exact time or moment that one
falls in love to someone is unidentifiable. This is a simple illustration that
love has surely no genuine duration. For Wittgenstein, love might be called an
“emotional disposition” (ibid.) For him, “a disposition is not interrupted by a
break in consciousness or a shift in attention” (RPP II 45). That explains why
it is impossible to point out the beginning and end of love. Being antithetical
to having genuine duration, love is not an emotion (Lin 2021, p. 279).
Another difference between love and emotion is by being put to the test.
An emotion need not be put to test. If one is angry one need not test if one is
really angry. Anger is just felt explicitly and shows itself clearly in bodily
expressions and actions. It just makes no sense to ask oneself if he is really
angry or not. You just know that you are.
While in love, to really know if someone loves, there is sense to put it to the test. And Wittgenstein remarked that love can be put to the test as opposed to emotions that can’t be. He says, “Emotional attitudes (e.g. love) can be put to the test, but not emotions” (RPP II 152). Testing love can be done through asking whether there are some things that the lover can do for his beloved. Lin (2021) gives us a good example for this, he writes, “For example: if B is in danger, will A go to rescue B; if B leaves for a place far away, will A miss B greatly; so on and so forth” (p. 280). If one cannot risk his life for his beloved then his love is doubtful – most probably not true love. And if one will not miss the other even after years of being apart. Then, maybe it is not true love. This is how love is different from emotion in terms of being put to the test. Love requires proof to be really considered as true. It is not as simple as emotion that requires no verification.
Love is not a feeling
In saying that love is not a
feeling, Wittgenstein points out three ways in which love differs from feelings
(ibid.). First, is in terms of endurance. Any feeling does not last for so
long. The feeling of being happy, for example, when you achieve something will
only approximately last for at least a second and at most a few days. This is
supported by the common claim that it is the journey that matters not the
actual achievement itself. Because what you will feel at the point of achieving
something is fleeting, it was memory of the journey that will last.
While, on the other hand, true love endures for a long time. We see
Wittgenstein writes in relation to this and says, “If it passes, then it was
not true love” (RPP I 115). An example would be that if one thinks or feels
that he loves someone, it is wise to wait it out. To wait and test a feeling
for endurance will make one sure that what he feels is not just a mere feeling
but true love. Because if what one feels
for someone fades out quickly in time then it was not true love but just some
kind of feeling – maybe a feeling of appreciation, attraction, or lust. But if
it will endure for a long time then it is not just a mere feeling, most
probably love.
The second distinction that love and feeling has is in terms of
expression. Wittgenstein writes, “For the characteristic mark of all “feelings”
is that there is expression of them, i.e. facial expression, gestures, of
feeling” (RPP II 320). Here it is clearly pointed out that feelings can be
expressed through (1) facial expression, and (2) bodily gestures. For example,
the feeling of being angry can be expressed and be seen in the pulling together
of eyebrows, widening of eyes, etc. It can also be expressed and be seen in the
shouting gesture or punching gesture, etc. But love cannot be expressed in the
same way that feelings can be expressed and be seen.
Third, is again in terms of putting to the test. A feeling like an
emotion needs not be put to test. While, as explained awhile back, love can be
put to the test.
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